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Abstract
Young people in Syria are facing difficulties entering the labor market. Labor 
supply pressures and weak labor demand from both the public and private 
sectors have led to persistently high levels of unemployment among the youth. 
Apart from tabulations of existing data, published research on the Syrian labor 
market is practically non-existent.  This study provides unique analytical insights 
into the education-employment link in Syria. Using data from the 2001 and 2002 
Labor Force Surveys, we describe the labor market situation, estimate returns 
to education, and analyze the transition from school to work for young people. 
We find that rates of return to education are low by international standards, 
but increase with the level of educational attainment. We find evidence that 
higher education is attractive because it increases the chances of finding a job, 
decreases queuing times for sought-after jobs in the public sector, and increases 
the opportunities for working abroad. Prior to 2001, graduates of post-secondary 
vocational schools (known in Syria as intermediate institutes) were guaranteed 
jobs in the public sector where government-set pay scales dictate wages. As a 
result, over 80 percent of intermediate institute graduates work in the public 
sector. In 2001, the Syrian government stopped guaranteeing jobs to graduates 
of intermediate institutes; they now have to look for jobs in the private sector 
that do not necessarily match the training they received. Indeed, we find that the 
rates of return to schooling are especially low for male graduates of intermediate 
institutes working in the private sector, indicating little benefit in terms of skills 
demanded. 
* We thank Noura Kamel for helpful research assistance. The authors are grateful to Serdar Sayan 
and participants at the Labor Economics sessions of the 12th Annual Conference of the Economic 
Research Forum (ERF) for their valuable comments and feedback.Introduction
Over the past decade, Syria has been moving from a centrally-planned to a more 
market-oriented economy, being referred to as a “social market economy.” The 
role  of  government  as  employer  has  been  diminishing  since  the  early  1990s, 
when the state abandoned its policy of mandatory government service, besides 
military  service,  for  university  graduates.  The  state  then  began  limiting  the 
types of educational credentials, at all levels, for which it guaranteed jobs in the 
public sector. By 2001, the government no longer guaranteed employment for 
graduates of most post-secondary vocational (intermediate) institutes, which had 
been the main path to employment in state-owned enterprises. See Appendix 1 
for a graphical representation of the Syrian education system in 2001–02. The 
government has been trying to limit the growth of public sector employment and 
openly maintains that it is up to the private sector to generate the needed jobs 
over the coming years. 
In its efforts to reform the economy and improve the ability of the private 
sector to create jobs, the Syrian government is pursuing policies that are expected 
to  lead  to  greater  economic  openness,  including  planned  participation  in  two 
major  regional  free  trade  arrangements  (the  Euro-Mediterranean  Free  Trade 
Area and the Arab Free Trade Area), less protection for public enterprises, and 
less restrictive government regulation of the private sector. The “social” part of 
the reform effort highlights the goal of maintaining a central role for the state, 
including regulation of private sector activities and maintaining a strong network 
of social services. The government is in the process of preparing its tenth ﬁve-year
plan, which is being touted as a blue-print for economic reform. 
The government reform effort is coming at an opportune time. Syria is facing a 
host of internal and external pressures, including the strong possibility that it will 
become a net oil importer within 5–7 years. The Syrian labor market is also facing 
substantial pressures. The labor market is characterized by large demographic 
pressures, sluggish labor demand, and deeply embedded rigidities leading to high 
youth unemployment and migration rates, especially to Lebanon and the oil-rich 
Gulf states. The education system in Syria is suspected of contributing to the 10 11
situation by failing to equip students with the skills demanded in the market. 
In  response  to  the  current  labor  market  situation,  the  Syrian  government  is 
considering a host of economic and education reforms. 
In many ways, the Syrian labor market situation is similar to that of other 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. Similarities include demographic 
trends that have resulted in high shares of youth in the working-age population 
during the 1990s and 2000s, low female labor force participation rates compared 
to other developing regions, the prominence of public sector employment, and 
obstacles to the development of private sector enterprises (Kabbani & Kothari, 
2005; World Bank, 2004a). The experience of Syria in relying on a public sector-led 
employment model is also similar to most countries of the MENA region (World 
Bank, 2004a; Boudarbat, 2004; Assaad, 1997).
Yet Syria also has unique labor market characteristics which make it interesting 
to study in light of research efforts to understand the linkages between poor labor 
market conditions, poverty alleviation, and economic growth. First, wages in Syria 
are low and education-earnings proﬁles are quite ﬂat. Average monthly wages of
full time secondary school graduates are only 20 percent higher than illiterate 
workers, and wages of university graduates are only 40 percent higher. Second, 
over 80 percent of the unemployed in Syria are young new labor market entrants. 
There is very little unemployment among males over age 30 and females over age 
40. Indeed, a large portion of the population is clustered at or near the national 
poverty line. In 2003–4, an estimated 11.4 percent of the population was poor and 
19 percent of the population was vulnerable to falling into poverty, bringing the 
share of poor and vulnerable groups to over 30 percent of the population (UNDP, 
2005). 
Apart from tabulations of existing data, published research on the Syrian labor 
market and education system is scarce. Recent studies have focused on examining 
the high rates of unemployment, especially among Syrian youth (Syrian European 
Business Center, 2003; FAFO Institute, 2005; Kabbani and Tzannatos, 2005). 
Labor market problems, however, may be exacerbated by low wage levels and 
weak returns to education. This paper studies the education-employment link in 
Syria. As the Syrian government pursues educational and economic reforms, it is 
important to understand to what extent higher levels of educational attainment 
might contribute to higher wages and better employment opportunities. If the 
association is weak, further investments in the quantity of education may not 
have the desired effect on increasing employment and economic growth. Instead, 
policies to improve the quality of the educational content and the functioning of 
the labor market should take precedence. Indeed, our analysis establishes that 
returns to schooling in Syria are low. We also ﬁnd evidence that a key beneﬁt to
obtaining additional years of schooling is shorter unemployment spells and better 
chances of obtaining employment in the public sector. 
The article is laid out thus: Section 2 provides an overview of the labor market 
conditions in Syria and compares the situation to other countries in the region. 
Section 3 provides an overview of Syria’s education system and again compares 
it to other countries in the region. These two sections rely on published data 
from  Syrian  Statistical  Abstracts,  the  World  Development  Indicators  (World 
Bank, 2004b), and International Labour Organization’s LABORSTA databases 
(ILO, 2004). Section 4 describes the school-to-work transition in Syria. Section 
5 describes the household survey data and methodology used in conducting the 
empirical analysis in this paper. Section 6 presents the results of our analysis and 
Section 7 concludes and discusses the policy implications of our research.
Labor Market Conditions in Syria
Like most other countries in the MENA region, Syria experienced high population 
growth  rates  of  around  3.5  percent  per  year  during  the  1970s  and  1980s—a 
combination of high fertility rates, falling infant mortality rates, and increasing 
life expectancy. Population growth rates eventually fell to less than 3 percent 
during the 1990s. As a result, a demographic wave of young people began moving 
through the population. This youth bulge is estimated to have peaked in 2005 
and has contributed to high labor force growth rates of between 5 and 6 percent 
per year. The labor force is projected to continue to expand by between 250,000–12 13
300,000 workers per year over the next 20 years. However, labor force growth 
rates are expected to fall steadily to under 3 percent by 2025 as the demographic 
wave moves into mid-career (Kabbani and Tzannatos, 2005). 
Another factor behind the high labor force growth rates during the 1980s and 
1990s is the increasing rates of female labor force participation, which rose steadily 
from 11.9 percent in 1983 to 21.3 percent in 2001, with the highest increases among 
the youth (ILO, 2004). We estimate that rising female labor force participation 
rates  represented  only  around  15  percent  of  labor  force  growth  of  the  1990s. 
However, this increase is likely to have affected labor supply pressures in speciﬁc
occupations that attract female workers and thus it may have a substantial effect 
on employment outcomes in these occupations. Indeed, unemployment rates for 
females are nearly three times as high as those for males (Figure 1). This gender 
differential may partly be due to labor supply pressures resulting from increasing 
female labor force participation rates.
Figure 1 Unemployment rates by age group (2002)
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Source: 2002 SCBS Labor Force Survey
International migration has helped relieve some of the labor supply pressures 
in Syria. Lebanon has been a major destination for low-skilled Syrian workers 
– an estimated 80 percent of Syrian workers in Lebanon have six years or less of 
schooling and most work for only a few months of the year (Syria Report, 2004). 
Estimates of the number of Syrian workers in Lebanon vary from 350,000 to 1 
million, with recent estimates closer to the lower ﬁgure. The number of Syrian
workers in Lebanon is thought to have declined by around 40 percent since the 
post-war construction boom of the mid-1990s and declined even further after the 
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Raﬁk Hariri in February 2005.
While Lebanon still provides an important destination for Syrian workers, its future 
role remains uncertain. More educated Syrian workers tend to ﬁnd employment in
oil-rich Gulf countries and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the Americas. Speciﬁc
numbers are not available. However, around 4000 Syrian students travel abroad 
each year to continue their studies and an estimated one half remain abroad to 
work.
In 2003, an estimated 28 percent of the civilian labor force worked in the 
public sector and 72 percent worked in the private sector (Figure 2). The size of 
the informal private sector (businesses not registered with the government) is 
uncertain, with estimates ranging from 39 percent of employment in 2001, to 24 
percent in 2002 and 37 percent in 2003. This variation indicates problems in the 
way the question is being asked and/or responded to. Over the past four decades, 
the Syrian government has been a dominant force in terms of both hiring workers 
and regulating the private sector. In 2003, over 75 percent of workers with post-
secondary education (intermediate institute or university degrees) worked in the 
public sector. 
The allocation of workers into the public, private formal and private informal 
sectors follows a ranking based on educational attainment. Workers with little 
formal education are far more likely than others to work in the informal sector. 
Workers with higher education most often work in the public sector. The private 
formal sector represents a middle ground, attracting between 20 and 40 percent 
of workers across most levels of educational attainment. The Syrian government 14 15
is no longer able to absorb the incoming educated workers. It began reforming 
its employment policies in the early 1990s when it no longer required ﬁve years
of  mandatory  public  service  from  public  university  graduates.  It  is  studying 
ways of reducing public sector employment and closing loss-making public sector 
enterprises. As a result, the economy must rely on the private sector to generate 
the necessary jobs.
Figure 2 Share of employment by sector and level of educational attainment (2003)
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Source: 2003 SCBS Labor Force Survey. 
Note: the distributions of workers by educational attainment across public and private sectors are similar 
in the 2001, 2002 and 2003 surveys. However, distributions across private formal and informal sectors are 
different, with 2001 and 2003 having similar distributions. 
The private sector in Syria, however, has not been able to generate adequate numbers of 
jobs to absorb the incoming young workers. As a result, unemployment rates are high, reaching 
10.6 percent in 2001 and 12 percent in 2002 among 15–64 year olds.1 In Syria, unemployment 
is concentrated among the youth. The unemployment rate stood at 28 percent among 15–19 
year-olds and 25 percent among 20–24 year-olds in 2002, compared to 6.3 percent among 
24–39 year-olds and less than 1 percent among 40–64 year-olds (Figure 1). In fact, fully 78 
percent of the unemployed population in Syria is 15–24 years old. In addition, ﬁrst-time job
seekers represented 68 percent of the unemployed population in 2002. Thus, unemployment in 
Syria is very much a labor market insertion problem involving young ﬁrst-time job seekers.
The Syrian labor market situation is similar to other countries in the MENA region, which 
are experiencing similar demographic trends and labor supply pressures from entering cohorts 
(Kabbani and Kothari, 2005). In most non-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries with 
available data, youth unemployment rates are several times higher than those for adults.2 
However,  Syria  stands  out  in  terms  of  the  sheer  magnitude  of  the  problem,  with  youth 
unemployment rates that are 6.5 times higher than those for adults (Figure 3). The large 
relative difference between youth and adult unemployment rates is partly the result of high 
unemployment rates among youth. However, it is also due to adult unemployment rates that, 
estimated at 4 percent in 2002, are substantially lower than in other countries in the region. 
For all non-GCC countries with available data, this share was between 35 and 60 percent, 
compared to 78 percent in Syria (Figure 4). 
Figure 3 Youth and adult unemployment rates, MENA countries (most recent year)
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1.  In 2003, the unemployment rate was estimated at 11.7 percent. However, this ﬁgure was generated though an
unemployment survey exceptionally conducted during the spring, a time of low levels of agricultural activity.
2.  The situation is similar among national workers in GCC countries, although these ﬁgures are complicated by the
presence of large numbers of expatriate workers. 16 17
After a series of intensive data collection efforts, the Syrian government has 
become more aware of the labor market situation and has responded in a number 
of ways. It is directly addressing the unemployment problem through the creation 
of an Agency for Combating Unemployment with a budget of $1 billion over 5 
years to fund job-creation activities. The government also introduced a number 
of legal and administrative changes making it easier for private sector companies 
to enter and expand in the market. For example, until recently, many industries 
were  closed  to  private  sector  investment,  including  television  manufacturing, 
banking, and secondary and university education; additional incentives for large 
scale private investment were introduced; and an extensive reform of its public 
education system was begun. The reforms in the public education system include 
curricula at all levels being revised; teachers being required to receive additional 
training and retraining; and the vocational education system undergoing extensive 
reform at both the secondary and post-secondary levels. 
Figure 4 Share of youth among the unemployed, MENA countries (most recent year)
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Source: ILO (2004)
In addition, the recent signing of trade agreements with other Arab countries 
and the anticipated signing of a trade agreement with the European Union will 
put further pressure on the private sector. These changes are, in turn, expected to 
increase the demand for skilled workers in technical occupations and may lead to 
mismatches between the skills of recent graduates and the needs of the labor market, 
placing even more importance on reforming the country’s education system.
The Educational Situation in Syria
The Syrian education system starts with pre-school education overseen by the Ministry of 
Education (see Appendix 1). Attendance is voluntary. In 2001–02, nine years of primary school 
(grades 1–6) and preparatory school (grades 7–9) were compulsory for children aged 6–15 years 
old.3 Successful completion of basic school (assessed through a national written examination) is 
a pre-requisite for access to general or vocational secondary education for another three years. 
Post-secondary education includes university studies (4–5 years), vocational “intermediate” 
institutes (2 years) and the recently created “technical colleges” (3 years). A small number 
of dropouts enroll in vocational training centers mainly under the Ministry of Industry, the 
Ministry of Construction, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Nearly two thirds of the Syrian labor 
force have completed primary education or less and only 21 percent have completed secondary 
or post-secondary education (Figure 5). 
3.  The education system was modiﬁed in 2003.  Primary and preparatory schooling were combined into one “basic
education” category that covers grades 1–9.  18 19
Figure 5 Educational attainment (share of working-age and labor force populations)
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Source: 2002 SCBS Labor Force Survey
Until recently, the education system in Syria was dominated by public schools. 
Private schools were permitted at the primary level but had to use public school 
curricula. A handful of private schools associated with various foreign embassies 
were allowed to operate and develop their own curricula with the expectation that 
their students would travel abroad to continue their education and work. Only 
in 2000 did the Syrian government allow the development of private preparatory 
schools, secondary schools, and universities. 
Over the past 50 years Syria experienced substantial increases in educational 
attainment. High amounts of public spending on education, free access to public 
schools, and mandatory schooling laws combined to encourage Syrian families to 
send their children to school and keep them enrolled longer. The average years 
of educational attainment increased from 1 in 1960 to nearly 6 by 2000 (Figure 
6). The average years of educational attainment in Syria now surpass most other 
non-GCC  countries.  However,  they  lag  behind  educational  attainment  in  the 
neighboring countries of Lebanon (not shown) and Jordan. 
Figure 6 Average years of schooling, age 25 and over (1960–2000)
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Syria has also achieved marked progress in reducing gender imbalances in 
educational attainment. However, it still lags behind many MENA countries in 
this regard.20 21
Figure 7 Average years of schooling age 25 and over, female/male ratio (1960–2000)
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The increases in the average years of schooling in Syria were largely driven 
by  increases  in  participation  at  the  primary  and  preparatory  levels.  At  the 
secondary level, however, Syria experienced a substantial decline in enrolment 
rates between 1985 and 2000, especially among males (Figure 8). Syria is the 
only MENA country besides Iraq to experience such declines. Several possible 
reasons contributed to this trend, including the demographic composition of the 
student body (with larger proportions of students coming from households with 
lower levels of parental education), steps taken by the Syrian government during 
that period to direct students away from general secondary and towards vocation 
secondary education (which is associated with higher dropout levels), a perceived 
increase in the difﬁculty of baccalaureate examinations (in order to ease supply
pressures  facing  the  public  university  system),  and  low  returns  to  secondary 
education (which also encourage student dropout). We will examine some of these 
possibilities in detail below.
Figure 8 Secondary school enrollment rates, by gender (1970–2000)
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Source: WDI (2004)
The School-to-Work Transition in Syria 
The school-to-work transition is quite different for males and females in Syria. 
There is near universal educational enrollment for both genders through age 10. 
Young males start entering the labor force around age 12. Around 50 percent of 
the male population is in the labor force by age 16 and over 80 percent by age 
21. The unemployment level among male youth increases steadily as more youth 
enter the labor force, reaching a peak of 21 percent of youth population by age 21 
before declining. The level of economic inactivity among males does not increase 
above 1-2 percent until the age of 46. Thereafter, the level of economic inactivity 
increases steadily, reaching 45 percent prior to retirement age (Figure 9). 22 23
Figure 9 Labor force status by age, males
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Females too start entering the labor force around age 12 (Figure 10). However, 
a larger proportion leaves school but never enters the labor force. The labor force 
participation rate for females continues increasing until age 23, when it reaches a 
peak of 34 percent. The level of unemployment also increases, reaching a peak of 
13 percent (corresponding to an age-speciﬁc unemployment rate of 44 percent) by
age 20. The labor force participation rate of the female population then declines 
steadily, reaching 6 percent just before retirement age. 
Figure 10 Labor force status by age, females
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Source: 2001 and 2002 SCBS Labor Force Surveys
In  order  to  focus  more  closely  on  the  school-to-work  transition,  we  focus 
our analysis in this section on those aged 13 to 34. By age 13, most youth have 
completed their primary schooling and some drop out of school. By age 34, most 
males are working and females are either working or not in the labor force. For 
age groups beyond 34, unemployment affects only a small portion of the workforce 
(around 5 percent of females and 1 percent of males). 24 25
Figure 11 Labor force status by educational attainment, males age 13–34 (2001–02)
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Source: 2001 and 2002 SCBS Labor Force Surveys
For males between the ages of 13 and 34, labor force participation rates are 
highest among those with the lowest and highest levels of educational attainment 
(Figure 11). However, much of the low labor force participation rates for those 
with  mid-levels  of  schooling  reﬂect high enrollment rates among preparatory
and secondary school completers. Except for the illiterate group, activity (both 
economic and educational) is near universal across levels of schooling. For the 
illiterate population, the lower rates of activity may be due to the predominance 
of rural households with seasonal jobs among this group. The situation is quite 
different for females (Figure 12).
Figure 12 Labor force status by educational attainment, females age 13–34 (2001–02)
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Source: 2001 and 2002 SCBS Labor Force Surveys
The level of labor force participation is also highest among those with the 
lowest and highest levels of schooling. However, once school enrollment is taken 
into account, it becomes clear that economic and educational activity increases 
with the level of schooling, reaching around 80 percent for intermediate institute 
and university graduates. This general trend is maintained among age groups 
that have generally completed school, i.e. ages 25–64 (Figure 13). Again, we note 
the large difference in female participation rates between intermediate institute 
and university graduates and other levels of educational attainment.26 27
Figure 13 Labor force status by educational attainment, females age 25–64 (2001–02)
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Source: 2001 and 2002 SCBS Labor Force Surveys
The ﬁgures above are somewhat complicated by the fact that other variables
associated with educational attainment may be contributing to the results. For 
example, if younger females tend to more often complete university education, and 
if younger females are also more likely to participate in the labor force, then we 
would expect to ﬁnd that university education is associated with higher labor force
participation rates, but for reasons independent of holding a university degree. To 
address this issue, we control for various individual and household characteristics 
using logistic regression analysis.
Data and Empirical Methods
The data used for the empirical part of this paper come primarily from the 2001 
and 2002 SCBS Labor Force Surveys. Both these two nationally-representative 
surveys have valid cases of 14,411 and 18,257 households respectively and primarily 
include  data  on  demographic  and  employment  characteristics  of  household 
members. To increase our sample size, we merge the data for the two surveys 
to conduct our analysis. The main variables used in the analysis are: monthly 
wages, hours worked, educational attainment, employment status, marital status, 
and employment sector (public/private, economic activity, and occupation). The 
analysis also uses data from the 2003 SCBS Labor Force Survey, also known as 
the  2003  unemployment  survey,  a  nationally-representative  survey  of  27,600 
households. The 2003 survey does not contain data on wages, but it does contain 
detailed information about unemployment (duration, preferences for working in 
the public or private sector, etc.). 
In our paper, returns to education are estimated using the standard Mincer 
human capital earnings function (Mincer, 1974) with log hourly wages as the 
dependent variable: 
(1)  ln(wi) = β0 + β1Si + β2Ei + β3Ei
2 + β4Xi + β5Hi + ε
Si is the highest level of schooling completed: illiterate, literate or primary, preparatory, 
vocational secondary, general secondary, intermediate institute, and university or above. The 
omitted category is “illiterate.” We use level of education attained to estimate the level of 
schooling instead of actual years of schooling, information for which was not collected. Ei 
is potential years of experience. It is calculated by subtracting an individual’s age from the 
expected age of school completion and the median age of ﬁrst obtaining a full time job for
that worker’s gender and level of educational attainment. The experience term is squared to 
take into account the quadratic structure of the age-earnings proﬁle. Xi is a vector of individual 
characteristics. Hi is a vector of household characteristics. 
We wish to distinguish between employment and returns to education in the private and 
the public sectors. This can be done by estimating Equation (1) separately for employees of 
the private and the public sector using OLS.4 While we do this, the choice of sector is likely 
to be an endogenous decision (van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988; Gyourko and Tracy, 1988). 
Young Syrians may pursue additional levels of schooling in order to improve their chances 
of securing a job in the public sector. In addition, estimates of returns to education obtained 
through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) involve a number of potential biases, most notable of 
which are sample section and measurement error. 
4. Our data do not allow us to distinguish reliably between workers in the private formal and informal sectors. 28 29
We  correct  for  selection  bias  using  Heckman’s  two-step  procedure  (Heckman,  1974; 
1979). First, we estimate an employment equation using household composition variables as 
instruments. In the second step, we introduce the inverse Mills ratio estimate from the ﬁrst
equation into the earnings function (1). We follow Tansel (2005) by using a multinomial 
logistic regression model to estimate the employment equation, focusing on three outcomes: 
not employed (Pi = 0),5 employed in the private sector (Pi = 1), and employed in the public 
sector (Pi = 2).6 The ﬁrst-stage labor force participation equation is thus of the form:
(2a)  ln [ Prob(Pi=1) / Prob(Pi=0) ] = α0 + α1 Xi + α2 Zi
(2b)  ln [ Prob(Pi=2) / Prob(Pi=0) ] = α0 + α1 Xi + α2 Zi
Xi includes all explanatory variables in equation (1). Zi includes several identiﬁers
which we argue inﬂuence the participation decision but are not correlated with the
error term of the wage equation (in effect, they do not directly affect wages). These 
variables are marital status, the number of children between the ages of 0–5 (pre-
school), and the number of children between the ages of 6–14. 
The  second  part  of  our  empirical  analysis  focuses  on  the  correlates  of 
unemployment.  Logistic  regression  analysis  is  used  to  estimate  the  following 
equation:
(3)  ln [ Prob(Ui=1) / Prob(Ui=0) ] = α0 + α1 Xi
where Ui=1 indicates that person i is unemployed and Ui=0 indicates that 
person i is employed. Xi is a vector of individual and household characteristics 
similar to those included in the participation equation above.
Empirical Results
Empirical studies from across the world, including the MENA region, ﬁnd that
higher educational attainment is associated with positive labor market outcomes 
for individuals. In terms of wages, the private returns to an additional year of 
schooling have been estimated at 7–15 percent (World Bank, 2004a; Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos, 2002; Card, 1999; Pritchett, 1999). Private returns to education 
tend to be higher for females than for males. In most developing regions, private 
returns tend to be higher for primary education than for secondary and university 
education (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). By contrast, in MENA countries, returns 
to education appear to increase with the level of schooling (World Bank, 2004a; 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). One reason may be that public employment 
plays a more central role in MENA than in other developing regions (World Bank, 
2004a;  Boudarbat,  2004)  and  higher  returns  to  education  for  high  school  and 
university graduates may reﬂect government pay scales rather than improved
productivity (Pritchett, 1999; Glewwe, 2002). 
Wages  in  Syria  are  low  and  the  age-  and  education-earnings  proﬁles are
quite ﬂat. Wages increase with age by around 2 percent per year for all levels of
educational attainment. Wages increase with educational attainment, but not by 
much. Average monthly wages of secondary school graduates are only 15 percent 
higher than those of illiterate workers among 25–29 year-olds, rising to 40 percent 
higher for 60–64 year olds. The situation is slightly better for university graduates 
whose wages are 40 percent higher than those of illiterate workers for the 25–29 
age group, rising to 80 percent higher for the 60–64 age group (Figure 14). 
5. The “not employed” group includes economically inactive individuals, the unemployed, and students. We do not 
include business owners, self-employed, and unpaid workers, all of whom are labor force participants.
6. Pons and Blanco (2005) instead rely on a switching equation to determine whether workers select the public or private 
sector. They assume a sequential decision process: ﬁrst whether to enter the labor force and then whether to work
in the private or public sector. In the case of Syria, some employment decisions might be linked to the possibility of 
obtaining a job in the public sector only. The more appropriate model in this case is a multinomial logit. However, the 
multinomial framework makes a strong assumption about the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Future work 
will try to address this issue within the context of a more elaborate model.30 31
Figure 14 Age-earnings proﬁle, by level of education (2001–02)
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The  wage  structure  is  ﬂatter in the public sector than in the private sector, probably
reﬂecting government pay scales (Figure 15). There is little difference between monthly (or
hourly) wages in the public and private sectors, with the largest difference for university 
graduates. However, public sector jobs have more beneﬁts, including job security, health care,
social security, opportunities for rents, and time for a second job after normal working hours. 
As a result, over 60 percent of unemployed workers with secondary and intermediate institute 
credentials desire jobs exclusively in the public sector.7 The rate is less for university graduates 
(47 percent), who tend to have signiﬁcantly higher wages in the private sector.
Figure 15 Monthly wages in the private and public sectors, by level of education
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The low wage proﬁles in Syria have important implications for the returns to
additional years of schooling and the levels of educational attainment sought. To 
estimate the returns to an additional year of schooling, we merge the 2001 and 
2002 SCBS Labor Force Survey data and use regressions that control for potential 
experience, potential experience squared, and correct for sample selection. Table 
1 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. The results 
suggest that hourly wages increase with the level of educational attainment in all 
cases. For males and females in the public sector, the results reﬂect public sector
wage steps that rise with higher levels of schooling. There is more variation in 
the private sector, especially for female wage earners. A main point to note here 
is that, for males working in the private sector, wages for vocational secondary 
school  completers  are  not  signiﬁcantly different than wages for intermediate
institute completers (who receive two additional years of schooling), suggesting 
possible skills mismatches between what is taught in technical schools and the 
needs of the private sector.
7. Author’s analysis of the 2003 SCBS Labor Force Survey.32 33
Table 1 OLS regression results of educational attainment on log hourly wages
Male-Private Male-Public Female-Private Female-Public
Educational Attainment
 Illiterate (omitted)
 Primary 0.056 ** 0.018 0.082 *    0.175 *
(0.018) (0.036) (0.037) (0.069)
 Preparatory 0.171 ** 0.164 ** 0.096 0.419 **
(0.022) (0.037) (0.052) (0.069)
 Vocational Secondary 0.301 ** 0.335 ** 0.107 0.547 **
  (0.052) (0.047) (0.112) (0.078)
 General Secondary 0.261 ** 0.369 ** 0.274 ** 0.554 **
  (0.029) (0.038) (0.068) (0.070)
 Intermediate Institute 0.328 ** 0.582 ** 0.444 ** 0.753 **
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.068) (0.068)
 University 0.609 ** 0.727 ** 0.672 ** 0.892 **
(0.041) (0.038) (0.072) (0.069)
Experience 0.044 ** 0.063 ** 0.008 * 0.021 **
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Experience, Squared -0.001 ** -0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 *
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural 0.001 0.030 ** -0.030 -0.004
(0.009) (0.011) (0.032) (0.015)
Constant -384.2 ** -774.0 ** -549.4 ** -642.9 **
(18.58) (21.83) (53.75) (27.32)
Sample size 10,803 10,202 1,296 3,129
R2 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.36
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. * Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Our OLS regression results do not control for possible selection bias. We attempt to control 
for sample selection using Heckman’s two-stage procedure. We include a number of additional 
variables in the selection equation, including marital status and the number of children between 
the ages of 0-5 (pre-school) and 6-14. Table 2 highlights the multinomial logistic regression 
results of the ﬁrst-stage employment equation.8 As expected, the odds of employment increase 
with experience for males and females. The relationship between employment and education 
is more complex. For females, higher levels of educational attainment are associated with 
higher odds of working in the public sector, but only educational attainment above secondary 
school levels are associated with higher odds of working in the private sector. These results 
generally accord with our OLS ﬁndings that, for females, returns to education are higher in
the public sector and for higher education levels in the private sector. For males, higher levels 
of educational attainment are associated with higher odds of working in the public sector but 
lower odds of working in the private sector. The results support the hypothesis that higher 
levels of educational attainment are both a way of obtaining higher wages as well as sought-
after jobs in the public sector.
Table 2 First-stage (multinomial logistic regression) results – employment equation
Male-Private Male-Public Female-Private Female-Public
Married  0.730 ** 0.852 ** -1.137 ** -0.446 **
(0.044) (0.050) (0.040) (0.035)
Number of Children ≤ 5 0.023 * 0.030 * -0.009 -0.032
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Number of Children 6–14 -0.021 ** -0.037 ** -0.019 * -0.119 **
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Educational Attainment
 Illiterate (omitted)
 Primary 0.144 ** 0.603 ** -0.144 ** 0.446 **
(0.043) (0.058) (0.040) (0.066)
 Preparatory -0.691 ** 0.471 ** -0.316 ** 1.362 **
(0.047) (0.061) (0.054) (0.068)
 Vocational Secondary -0.661 ** 1.136 ** 0.131 2.234 **
  (0.093) (0.091) (0.117) (0.096)
 General Secondary -1.178 ** 0.468 ** -0.305 ** 1.785 **
  (0.054) (0.064) (0.068) (0.071)
 Intermediate Institute -0.438 ** 1.567 ** 0.540 ** 3.380 **
  (0.077) (0.074) (0.080) (0.071)
 University -0.885 ** 1.209 ** 0.861 ** 3.082 **
(0.079) (0.072) (0.088) (0.078)
Experience 0.159 ** 0.222 ** 0.078 ** 0.146 **
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
8.  The sample size is smaller for males than for females because there are more male non-wage workers (self-employed, 
business owners, and unpaid workers) who are not included in the regression. 34 35
Experience, Squared -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.002 ** -0.003 **
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural -0.377 ** 0.029 0.449 ** 0.242 **
(0.020) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028)
Constant 115.9 ** 411.8 ** -176.4 ** 169.9 **
(38.57) (45.70) (54.35) (51.35)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.049 -0.475 ** 0.066 0.190 **
(0.037) (0.032) (0.037) (0.036)
Sample size 23,863 22,568 44,718 45,918
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. * Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Other results generally accord with expectations. Married females are less 
likely  to  work,  while  married  males  are  more  likely  to  work.  The  number  of 
children in a household is associated with lower odds of employment for males and 
females. This is probably because we are not able to distinguish “own children,” 
and so “children” include siblings and others. 
The results of the second-stage are very close to those of OLS for the private 
sector. For the public sector, there appears to be negative sample selection for 
males  and  positive  sample  selection  for  females.  One  interpretation  of  these 
results is that males who self-select into the public sector are less productive, 
while females who self-select are more productive than average (Tansel, 2005). 
Returns to primary and preparatory education are especially low for males in the 
public sector and females in the private sector. Returns to education for male 
secondary school completers working in the private sector are not signiﬁcantly
different from wages for intermediate institute completers, suggesting possible 
skill mismatches. 
Table 3 Second-stage regression results—educational attainment on log hourly wages
Male-Private Male-Public Female-Private Female-Public
Educational Attainment
 Illiterate (omitted)
 Primary 0.053 ** -0.112 ** 0.085 * 0.287 **
(0.019) (0.037) (0.037) (0.071)
 Preparatory 0.189 ** 0.061 0.090 0.659 **
(0.025) (0.038) (0.052) (0.081)
 Vocational Secondary 0.317 ** 0.113 * 0.116 0.904 **
  (0.054) (0.051) (0.111) (0.101)
 General Secondary 0.291 ** 0.255 ** 0.264 ** 0.850 **
  (0.037) (0.039) (0.068) (0.088)
 Intermediate Institute 0.336 ** 0.306 ** 0.477 ** 1.242 **
  (0.038) (0.043) (0.071) (0.113)
 University 0.628 ** 0.486 ** 0.715 ** 1.357 **
(0.043) (0.042) (0.076) (0.110)
Experience 0.039 ** 0.002 0.011 ** 0.035 **
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Experience, Squared -0.001 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 **
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural 0.009 0.025 * -0.009 0.023
(0.011) (0.011) (0.034) (0.016)
Constant -387.3 ** -836.9 ** -568.4 ** -629.4 **
(18.74) (23.32) (54.61) (27.91)
Sample size 10,803 10,202 1,296 3,129
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. * Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
In terms of magnitude, these rates of return are low by international standards, 
implying that labor productivity is possibly quite low. The one exception is females 
in the public sector, who have quite high rates of return. The rates of return for 
an  additional  year  of  schooling  tend  to  increase  with  the  level  of  educational 
attainment.  The  highest  rates  of  return  are  for  additional  years  of  schooling 
beyond secondary education (Figure 16). Average rates of return compare the 
wages  at  different  levels  of  educational  attainment  to  the  wages  of  illiterate 
workers, whom we assume to have zero years of education: 6 years of primary, 3 
years of preparatory, 3 years of secondary (general and vocational), followed by 2 
years of intermediate institutes or 5 years of university. Average rates of return 36 37
range from -2 percent per year for males with a primary education working in the 
public sector to over 8 percent per year for female graduates of an intermediate 
institute or university in the public sector. Rates of return for females are higher 
than for males, a ﬁnding that is consistent with international evidence. The large
differences in returns to education between females in the private and public 
sectors indicate larger differences between the wage rates of illiterate and literate 
female workers in the public sector than in the private sector, and could be the 
result of public sector wage scales and low productivity and/or wage discrimination 
in the private sector.
 
Figure 16 Average rates of return to schooling by sector and gender
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Rates of return to education can be presented in terms of marginal rates, which 
estimate the rates of return of going from one level of schooling to the next (for 
example, the additional return to a high school graduate of completing college). 
We compare the returns of university graduates to those of general secondary 
graduates. We compare the graduates of intermediate institutes to a weighted 
average  of  the  returns  of  vocational  and  general  secondary  school.9  We  ﬁnd
marginal rates of return for primary education between 0–4 percent and marginal 
rates of return for secondary education of around 5 percent, both of which are 
low by international standards, implying that labor productivity is possibly low 
compared to other countries. Also, rates of return in Syria tend to increase with 
level of education, which is counter to some international evidence that ﬁndshigher
rates of return at the primary school levels. The highest rates of return are for 
additional years of schooling for females beyond secondary education (Figure 17). 
The returns to higher education are slightly higher in the private sector for men 
and in the public sector for women. However, this analysis is based on “reported” 
wages and not on “real” wages. In particular, for men working in the public sector, 
the reported private beneﬁts of additional schooling may underestimate the real
beneﬁts due to unreported earnings from second jobs in the private sector and
work in the informal sector. 
Figure 17 Marginal rates of return to schooling by sector and gender
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9. The weights are by number of cases by gender and sector. They roughly translate into ¼ for vocational and ¾ for 
general secondary across all groups.38 39
The marginal rates of return are especially low for primary school completers, 
for male graduates of intermediate institutes working in the private sector, for 
male graduates of vocational secondary education in the public sector, and for 
females in the private sector with primary, preparatory or vocational secondary 
certiﬁcation. Rates of return for female graduates of intermediate institutes are
especially high, possibly because at the time only females received training in 
textile manufacturing, a sought-after skill in the private and public sectors. 
We hypothesize that higher education is attractive because it increases the 
chances  of  ﬁnding a job (especially in the public sector), reduces wait times,
increases the opportunities for working abroad, and may include higher non-wage 
beneﬁts. While the 2001–02 SCBS surveys did not collect data on unemployment
duration, an analysis of unemployment rates by year after expected graduation 
shows that they decline rapidly with age, especially for university graduates. For 
males, the unemployment rate decreases to 20 percent in 2 years after expected 
graduation for university graduates, 6 years for intermediate institutes, and 8 
years  for  secondary  education  (Figure  18).  For  females,  the  transition  period 
is  even  longer  (Figure  19).  However,  the  difference  between  graduates  from 
university and intermediate institutes is not signiﬁcant: 7 years after graduation,
the unemployment rate for both groups is about 20 percent. The unemployment 
rate for female secondary school graduates remains constant at around 30 percent 
after 10 years of graduation.
Figure 18 Unemployment rate by year after graduation, males 15–64 (average 2001–03)
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Figure 19 Unemployment rate by year after graduation, females 15–64 (average 2001–03)
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Given the expressed desire among the unemployed for jobs in the public sector, 
unemployed graduates are, to a large extent, queuing for public sector jobs, where 
queuing times decrease with level of education. In this public sector model, hiring 
decisions are often based on the ranking in the labor market queue and the place 
in the queue depends on the level of education, not the quality or type of education. 
Thus,  higher  levels  of  educational  attainment  may  be  sought,  not  primarily 
because of higher wages, but because of higher chances of obtaining employment, 
especially in the public sector.
This employment model is at risk as the private sector starts to play a greater 
role. One example is males who receive training in intermediate institutes. Rates 
of return are especially low for male graduates of intermediate institutes working 
in  the  private  sector  (Figure  12),  indicating  low  levels  of  productivity.  Until 
recently, graduates of intermediate institutes were guaranteed jobs in the public 
sector where government-set pay scales dictate wages. As a result, over 80 percent 
of intermediate institute graduates work in the public sector. However since 2001, 40 41
government jobs have no longer been guaranteed and male graduates have had to 
search for jobs that do not necessarily match the training they received. 
To obtain a better sense of the unemployment conditions in Syria, we consider 
a logistic regression model of unemployment among labor force participants in 
2001–02. As we did in Section 4 above, we limit our analysis to those between 
the ages of 13–34, when unemployment is most pronounced. Instead of age, we 
use the estimated number of years since an individual completed the highest 
level of education he/she attained. The reason is that age is highly correlated 
with educational attainment. For example, there are relatively more unemployed 
university  graduates  at  age  25  than  unemployed  secondary  school  graduates 
simply because, at age 25, university graduates have just entered the labor force. 
For males and females between the ages of 13 and 34, the odds of unemployment 
decline with estimated years since completing school (Table 4). For females, the 
odds of unemployment are highest among primary school completers and lowest 
among  post-secondary  school  completers—although,  we  note  again,  we  do  not 
control for age. For younger age groups, the odds of unemployment are temporarily 
higher for more recent school completers. For males, the odds of unemployment are 
highest among preparatory and general secondary completers and lowest among 
university completers and illiterate workers. 
Table 4 Regression— unemployment among labor force participants age 13–34 (2002)
Females (age 13–34) Males (age 13–34)
Years Since Completion of 
Highest
Educational Level Attained -0.099 (0.02) ** -0.145 (0.01) **
Years Since Completion, 
Squared
0.000 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00)
Educational Attainment
 Illiterate -0.280 (0.13) * -0.392 (0.12) **
 Literate/Primary 0.249 (0.10) * -0.184 (0.06) **
 Preparatory omitted
 Voc Secondary 0.278 (0.20) -0.170 (0.15)
 Gen Secondary -0.036 (0.14) -0.044 (0.10)
 Intermediate Institute -0.990 (0.13) ** -0.112 (0.11)
 University -1.144 (0.17) ** -0.623 (0.14) **
Married  -1.369 (0.14) ** -1.424 (0.12) **
Household Characteristics
 Kids 0-5 Present 0.087 (0.10) -0.031 (0.07)
 Kids 6-12 Present 0.039 (0.09) -0.026 (0.06)
 Rural Household (HH) -0.576 (0.07) ** 0.284 (0.04) **
 Number of HH Members 0.072 (0.02) ** 0.126 (0.01) **
 Number of Kids 0-12 -0.144 (0.04) ** -0.153 (0.02) **
Other Household Members
 Number of Employed -0.486 (0.03) ** -0.351 (0.02) **
 Number of Unemployed 0.945 (0.04) ** 0.618 (0.02) **
Constant -262.4 (116) * -433.4 (78.5) **
Sample Size 9,534 27,823
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.22
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. * Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Marriage is associated with lower odds of unemployment among both males 
and females. Living in a rural area is associated with lower odds of unemployment 
among females but higher odds among males. Larger households are associated with 
higher odds of unemployment, and having more children is associated with lower 
odds of unemployment among both males and females. The odds of unemployment 
are lower for individuals living in households with other employed workers and 
higher  in  households  with  other  unemployed  workers.  This  ﬁnding leads to
concerns that unemployment may be a household phenomenon and suggests the 
possibility of strong networking ties in the labor market, with members of outsider 
households struggling to ﬁnd work.42 43
Conclusions and Policy Discussion
The ﬁndingsofourpapersuggestthat,inSyria,educationalattainmentisimportant
for the kind of job one can ﬁnd and how fast, but not necessarily for workplace
productivity.  Returns  to  schooling  are  very  low  by  international  standards, 
especially for secondary education and below. Higher educational attainment is 
attractive because it increases the chances of ﬁnding a job, decreases queuing
times for sought-after jobs in the public sector, may increase the opportunities for 
working abroad, and includes higher non-wage beneﬁts.
Labor supply pressures from new entrants combined with weak labor demand 
from both the public and private sectors led to unemployment rates of around 12 
percent in 2002. Youth (15–24) and ﬁrst-timejobseekersrepresented,respectively,
78 percent and 68 percent of the unemployed population in Syria in 2002. Thus, 
unemployment is very much a labor market insertion problem involving young 
ﬁrst-time job seekers. To ease the school-to-work transition, the government
should (1) improve the quality of the education system (especially the vocation 
and technical education systems) and ease the functioning of the labor market by 
(2) improving the human resources policies in the public sector and (3) loosening 
labor and product market regulations to promote the development and growth of 
private sector enterprises and encourage ﬁrms in the informal sector to join the
formal economy.
Reform of Vocational Secondary Education and Post-Secondary 
Technical Institutes     Post-secondary intermediate institutes largely service 
the needs of public sector enterprises, which (until 2001) guaranteed jobs to 
institute graduates at wage levels established through government-set pay 
scales. As a result, over 80 percent of intermediate institute graduates worked in 
the public sector in 2001. The Syrian government recently stopped guaranteeing 
jobs and graduates must instead look for private sector work that does not 
necessarily match the training they received. Our empirical ﬁndings suggest the
rates of return to schooling are especially low for male intermediate institute 
graduates working in the private sector, indicating possible mismatches between 
the education they receive and the needs of the labor market. The government 
should strengthen the relevance of vocational education and training for the 
private sector. To be more relevant, vocational education needs (i) stronger 
links with the private sector and (ii) to ensure that students are being trained 
in relevant occupations, in part through the development of labor market 
information systems.
Improving Human Resources Policies in the Public Sector     The full 
beneﬁts of investing in the quality and relevance of the education system will
not materialize unless there is adequate demand for skilled labor. Mandatory 
government recruitment of graduates from some post-secondary education 
institutes was recently abolished. This is a step in the right direction but 
government agencies and public sector enterprises should now be encouraged 
to adopt redundancy and attrition policies aimed at reducing overstafﬁng and
improving labor force utilization through longer effective working times. These 
policies could be coupled with explicit salary premiums to retain key qualiﬁed
personnel. The guiding principle should be “fewer but better used, better paid, 
and more motivated public sector employees.”
Promoting Development and Growth of the Private Sector      The private 
sector must play a primary role in absorbing new workers over the coming years 
and policies should be adopted to support its development and growth. Over the 
past two decades, the Syrian government has done much to create a healthier 
business environment: Private banks have been allowed to open, ofﬁcial
exchange rates have been brought in line with international rates, and barriers 
to entry have been removed for most industries. Still, more can be done. The 
government should remove the remaining barriers to private sector entry and 
phase out both implicit and explicit subsidies to public sector enterprises. Private 
sector companies should face clear and reasonable registration requirements. 
The corporate tax system should be simpliﬁed and tax rates reduced. These
steps might actually increase tax revenues by improving compliance. Finally, 
the government should follow through on proposals to reform the country’s labor 
laws, including worker dismissal laws. 44 45
Improving Social Safety Nets     An increased reliance on the private sector 
for generating jobs coupled with public sector retrenchment policies and more 
ﬂexible labor laws will lead to greater labor mobility. Appropriate worker safety
nets, therefore, should be developed. Continuing education and retraining 
programs can help facilitate and support labor mobility. The Syrian government 
should anticipate that the share of mid-career workers among the unemployed 
might begin to rise in the near future and should begin to prepare policies and 
programs that cater to the needs of the adult unemployed, including retraining 
programs and an unemployment insurance system.
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Appendix 1
The Education System in Syria in 2001–02
Pre-school
Primary 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Preparatory 7, 8, 9
Vocational Secondary 10, 11, 12
General Secondary 10, 11, 12
Technical College 13, 14, 15–16
Intermediate Institutes 13, 14
University 13, 14, 15, 16–17
Note: The education system was changed in 2003 whereby primary and preparatory 
schooling were combined into “basic education” that covers grades 1–9.  